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HIGHLIGHTS OF INSURANCE LAW




During recent years, the law of wrongful termination has ex-
panded considerably as courts continue to define new theories of re-
covery. While actions for breach of a formal employment contract
have existed for many years, modern wrongful termination law in-
cludes new theories such as breach of an implied contract of employ-
ment,' termination in violation of public policy, and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.' Because of the re-
cent expansion in this area of the law that allows tort remedies on
what was previously a contract cause of action, and because of an
increase in the number of wrongful termination suits, insurance cov-
erage of such claims is of increasing interest to employers and their
liability carriers.
Under a traditional breach of contract claim, the plaintiff al-
leges the existence of a written employment contract and the defend-
ant employer's breach of its terms.3 For a number of reasons, courts
have had little trouble determining that an insured's breach of con-
tract is not generally covered by conventional liability insurance poli-
cies. The more recent tort theories of wrongful discharge, however,
have led to confusion and litigation regarding the existence of insur-
ance coverage for such claims. Under a theory such as breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a former employee
typically alleges a long period of employment, the employer's policy
* Associate, Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon, San Francisco, California. A.B., University
of California, Los Angeles, 1980; J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1984.
I. Touissiant v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
2. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App.3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986); Pugh
v. See's Candies. Inc., 116 Cal. App.3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1971).
3. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
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of providing due process rights prior to termination, and the em-
ployer's violation of that policy by abrupt termination without good
cause.4 A typical allegation of discharge in violation of public policy
alleges that an employer violated a worthy public policy in terminat-
ing the plaintiff's employment, such as the retaliatory dismissal of an
employee who sought to exercise statutory rights. Such causes of ac-
tion sound in tort, and the remedy is not limited to contract benefits.
They generate a number of issues regarding liability insurance
coverage.
An initial public policy question is raised as to whether employ-
ers should be allowed to obtain insurance at all for liability based on
conduct such as wrongful termination. An employer's intentional,
wrongful termination of employment is socially undesirable conduct
for which, arguably, there should be no insurance. This Article will
not address this policy question except to note that the trend in this
rapidly expanding area seems to be toward liability based on unin-
tentional, merely negligent conduct. For this reason, a blanket prohi-
bition of insurance coverage for wrongful termination is
inappropriate.
Because of this expanding, unsettled area of law, courts must
determine whether an employer's liability is covered under any one
of several potential types of insurance policies. This Article will ad-
dress potential coverage under several of these policies: a comprehen-
sive general liability policy; a director's and officer's indemnity pol-
icy; a professional liability or errors and omissions liability policy; a
workers' compensation/employer's liability policy; an umbrella pol-
icy; and a homeowner's policy. Because these standard policies were
largely written before the expansion of wrongful termination law and
the development of new theories of recovery, the coverage analysis
for wrongful termination claims is imprecise and problematical. This
Article will address the most common of those problems.
An understanding of the two basic obligations created by an in-
surance policy is necessary to any coverage analysis. A standard lia-
bility policy obligates the insurer to defend the insured against cov-
ered claims as well as to indemnify the insured for damage that it is
obligated to pay because of a covered claim. The duty to pay dam-
ages, or indemnify, is not necessarily coextensive with the duty to
defend. The duty to defend is determined at the outset of the action
4. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983); Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc., III Cal. App.3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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based on the allegations of the complaint and the insurer's knowl-
edge of the claim. Because the theory of liability and the type of
damages that may eventually be awarded cannot be anticipated at
the time the action is brought, the duty to defend is construed
broadly to include any claim that could potentially result in damages
covered by the policy. An insured may therefore be entitled to a le-
gal defense against a claim even though the damages eventually
awarded are not covered by the policy. As long as the potential for
coverage exists, the duty to defend exists.5 This Article analyzes both
the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify against wrongful ter-
mination claims.
Another less obvious preliminary point is that liability insurance
policies generally provide coverage of particular types of damages as
opposed to particular theories of recovery." For this reason, coverage
analysis does not center on whether the claim is one for wrongful
termination, but on whether it is for the type of loss or damage the
policy covers.
II. Coverage Under a Comprehensive General Liability Policy
A typical comprehensive general liability policy contains a pro-
vision such as: "The company will pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this
insurance applies, caused by an occurrence." 7 This basic coverage
provision raises a number of questions, including whether a wrong-
fully terminated plaintiff suffers "bodily injury" or "property dam-
age" and whether such injury is the result of an "occurrence."
In addition, a comprehensive general liability policy generally
contains a number of possibly applicable exclusions:
This insurance does not apply:
To liability assumed by the insured under any contract
or agreement except an incidental contract...
To any obligation for which the insured or any carrier
as his insurer may be held liable under any workmens'
compensation, unemployment compensation, or disabil-
5. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966).
6. There are a few notable exceptions, such as "personal injury" coverage. Further, some
courts have held that damages resulting from the breach of an express contract are not covered
under a general liability policy. See. e.g., International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Devonshire
Coverage Corp., 93 Cal. App.3d 601, 611, 155 Cal. Rptr. 870, 875 (1979).
7. Insurance Services Office, Inc., copyright 1973.
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ity benefits law, or under any similar law...
To bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising
out of and in the course of his employment by the in-
sured ...
Any of these exclusions may be applicable to a claim of wrongful
termination.
A. Bodily Injury
The policy defines several of the terms used in the coverage pro-
vision. "Bodily injury" is often defined in relevant part to mean
"bodily injury, sickness, or disease which occurs during the policy
period." Some policies add that mental anguish or injury is bodily
injury if it arises out of bodily injury, sickness, disease or knowledge
of impending death.
Most wrongful termination plaintiffs do not sustain physical in-
jury as that term is commonly understood, and it is unclear whether
emotional distress is "bodily injury" within the meaning of an insur-
ance policy that does not refer to emotional or mental injury. Under
the common law of some states, pure emotional distress8 or emo-
tional distress that causes physical consequences9 is "bodily injury"
for insurance purposes. Emotional distress that is unaccompanied by
physical consequences may not constitute bodily injury.
On the other hand, courts are increasingly willing to award
damages for purely emotional injury unaccompanied by physical in-
jury.10 Since the fundamental purpose of liability insurance is pro-
tection against liability for unintended injury arising from the in-
sured's tortious conduct, the law of insurance coverage will probably
parallel the expanding remedies available to plaintiffs. As a result,
even purely emotional injury should be considered bodily injury
within a general liability policy coverage provision; to date, at least
one court has indicated that mental or emotional injury may be cov-
ered. 1 Considering that complaints are liberally amended, and that
a plaintiff need merely add the words "and resulting physical injury"
to his alleged mental injury claims to trigger the potential for cover-
8. Levy v. Duclaux, 324 So.2d I (La. 1975); but see Nickens v. McGehee, 184 So.2d
271 (La. 1966).
9. See, e.g., Employer's Casualty Ins. Co. v. Foust, 29 Cal. App.3d 382, 105 Cal. Rptr.
505 (1977).
10. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal.3d 916, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813
(1980) (cause of action may be stated for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress).
II. See Abellon v. Hartford Ins. Co., 167 Cal. App.3d 21, 212 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1985).
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age, 12 a duty to defend arises out of the allegation of mental injury if
there is potential coverage under the other policy terms.1
3
B. Property Damage
Compensatory damages arising out of the breach of the employ-
ment contract generally include lost wages and employment benefits.
Such losses are considered intangible financial losses, not bodily in-
jury or property damage within the meaning of an insurance pol-
icy.14 Since the policy often defines "property damage" to include
only physical injury to, or the loss of use of, tangible property, these
losses are not subject to coverage.
C. Breach of Contract
Although general liability policies insure against particular
types of loss, such as "bodily injury" or "property damage," rather
than against particular theories of liability, some courts have deter-
mined, nonetheless, that damages resulting from a breach of con-
tract are not covered. The coverage provision of a standard general
liability policy obligates the insurer to pay amounts that the insured
"shall become legally obligated to pay as damages." Courts have in-
terpreted this language to apply to damages resulting from tort, but
not contract, liability.' 5 In a recent California case, Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co. v. City of Turlock, 6 a discharged employee sued his
employer for fraud and breach of an agreement to keep secret the
terms of his resignation. The damages recovered under the contract
cause of action included damage to character and reputation, and
12. See Employer's Casualty Ins. Co. v. Foust, 29 Cal. App.3d 382, 105 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1977).
13. Attorneys may be reluctant to include allegations of physical or mental injury in a
complaint against the plaintiff's employer, however, because of authority indicating that the
workers' compensation system has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. See Bayliss v. Phila-
delphia Nat'l League Club, 472 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protec-
tion Dist., 43 Cal.3d 148, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 729 P.2d 743 (1987). In some states, the work-
ers' compensation act is not the exclusive remedy for tort damage solely arising from
emotional distress, see, e.g., Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga.
1983), while in other states, claims for emotional distress are preempted by state workers'
compensation statutes. See, e.g., Schroder v. Payton-Hudson Corp., 456 F. Supp. 652 (E.D.
Mich. 1978).
14. Southeastern Color Lithographers, Inc. v. Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co., 164 Ga. App.
70, 296 S.E.2d 378 (1982) (lost wages are not property damage within liability insurance
policy); see also Giddings v. Industrial Indem., 112 Cal. App.3d 213, 169 Cal. Rptr. 278
(1981).
15. See, e.g., International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Devonshire Coverage Corp., 93 Cal.
App.3d 601, 611, 155 Cal. Rptr. 870, 875 (1979).
16. 170 Cal. App.3d 988, 216 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1985).
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the jury had been instructed that it could award damages for emo-
tional distress resulting from the breach of contract. The appellate
court decided that all of the damages resulted from the breach of
contract and, therefore, they were not covered under the insurer's
comprehensive general liability policy. The case did not, however,
concern an insurer's duty to defend, and its reasoning does not apply
to a comprehensively pleaded complaint for wrongful termination
that includes noncontractual causes of action and alleges tortious
conduct.
D. Occurrence
A liability coverage agreement generally provides that injury
must be caused by an "occurrence," which may be defined as fol-
lows: "An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage,
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."
"Accident" is not defined further by standard policies. Courts have
determined, however, that an accident for insurance policy purposes
is a sudden event resulting in injury unintended by the insured.1"
Under such reasoning, wrongful termination is usually not an "acci-
dent," and the resulting injuries are not unintended and unexpected.
For example, a federal district court in Missouri, applying both
Massachusetts and Missouri law to two different policies, held that
the above-quoted definition of a covered occurrence did not cover
claims arising from wrongful employment termination. In Interco,
Inc. v. Mission Insurance Co.,18 the court considered whether such a
claim could be an "accident" within the definition of "occurrence."
The court recognized that, under the law of both states, "an injury
resulting from an intentional act can be an 'accident' within the
meaning of an insurance policy if the insured did not specifically in-
tend to cause resulting harm or was not substantially certain that
such harm would occur."19 The court also acknowledged that when
he fired the employee, the employer "may or may not have specifi-
cally intended to cause the emotional and physical harm and injury
to [the employee's] reputation."20 Nonetheless, the court held that
such conduct could not be considered an accident because the em-
17. See 7 ALR 3d 1261. A few courts define the term more broadly by holding that the
injury-causing event need be unexpected only by the injured claimant. See, e.g., Maxon v.
Security Ins. Co., 214 Cal. App.2d 603, 612, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1963).
18. 626 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
19. Id. at 891.
20. Id.
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ployer had to have been "substantially certain that such harm would
occur."" In addition, the court held that the claim was related to
employment and was, therefore, excluded by an express exclusion of
"personal injury sustained by any person as a result of an offense
directly or indirectly related to the employment or prospective em-
ployment of such person by the named insured." 2 The court con-
cluded that neither of the involved insurers was obligated to defend
or indemnify the insured employer.
A California court similarly has determined that, under a "plain
language" general liability policy, wrongful termination is not an
"accidental event" subject to insurance policy coverage. In St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Superior Court," the court held
that because the "termination of. . .employment was not an unin-
tentional, unexpected, chance occurrence," the policy provided no
coverage. " The plaintiffs in that case, however, alleged only inten-
tional, malicious conduct and did not allege acts which could be con-
sidered unintentional or merely negligent.
In addition, the case concerned language differing from a stan-
dard general liability policy. A standard policy provides coverage for
injury arising from an "occurrence," which is defined elsewhere in
the policy as an "accident which results in bodily injury unexpected
and unintended by the insured." By contrast, the plain-language pol-
icy involved in St. Paul provided coverage of injury caused by an
"accidental event," which was not defined in the policy. 25 The dis-
tinction may not be significant, considering the court's implication
into the policy of a requirement that the injury be an "unexpected,
chance" event. 6
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in St. Paul
Mercury Insurance Co. v. Ralee Engineering27 that an insurer had
no duty to defend a wrongful discharge action under a comprehen-
sive general liability policy where the plaintiff alleged that the in-
sured employer had maliciously and willfully harassed him and
made him work long hours in an attempt to cause him to resign. The
employee's complaint included causes of action for wrongful termi-
nation and intentional infliction of emotional distress; the employee
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 161 Cal. App.3d 1199, 208 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1984).
24. Id. at 1202, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
25. See id. at 1201-02, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7.
26. Id. at 1202, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
27. 804 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986).
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apparently did not allege merely negligent conduct.
The Court of Appeals recognized that the insurer must defend
the action if there is a potential for liability based on nonintentional
conduct. The insured employer argued that, despite the fact that the
complaint alleged only intentional conduct, there was a potential for
damage based upon negligence and, therefore, the insurer had an
obligation to defend. The court summarily rejected the employer's
argument and held that the insurer need not defend or indemnify the
employer because there was no potential liability for nonintentional
conduct which could be considered an accidental event.
Because the coverage provision of a general liability policy typi-
cally requires that the injuries result from an "occurrence," which is
defined by the policy as an "accident," wrongful termination claims
are seldom covered. The potential for coverage does exist, however, if
the claimant alleges conduct of the employer that could be consid-
ered merely negligent." In such a case, a duty to defend the em-
ployer arises and resolution of the indemnity obligation depends
upon whether the evidence developed during litigation supports a
finding of unintentional conduct.29
E. Intentional Acts Exclusion
Policies frequently exclude injury "caused intentionally by or at
the direction of the insured." Even in the absence of an express ex-
clusion, such a provision is implied by statute or judicial decision as
a matter of public policy. Those cases such as St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Superior Court0 and St. Paul Mercury
Insurance Co. v. Ralee Engineering,"1 which hold that wrongful ter-
mination is not an "accidental event" within a coverage provision,
imply that employment termination is an intentional act and there-
fore within the intentional acts exclusion.
An exclusion, however, is construed differently than a coverage
provision. In a coverage dispute, the insured employer generally has
the burden of proving that the claim against it comes with the insur-
ing agreement; the insurer has the burden of proving that the claim
28. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Bisell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
29. See Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 11,78 (7th Cir. 1980) (under um-
brella policy, insurer was obligated to defend an employee's sex discrimination action because
the complaint was pleaded in such general terms that it could include unintentional discrimi-
nation, which would be an "occurrence").
30. 161 Cal. App.3d 1199, 208 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1984).
31. 804 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986).
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comes within an exclusion. 2 Under the law of many states, an inten-
tional act can cause an unintentional injury that would not be ex-
cluded from liability coverage.33 Since only injury specifically in-
tended by the insured is excluded, and since the insurer has the
burden of proving the application of the exclusion, an insurer deny-
ing coverage based on an intentional acts exclusion must prove the
insured employer's specific intent to injure its discharged employee.
3 4
Although plaintiffs frequently allege a cause of action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress,35 the newly-developed causes of
action for wrongful discharge are not dependent upon the specific
intent to cause injury. To support a cause of action based on breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff
alleges the employer's custom and practice of using particular disci-
plinary policies, or a course of conduct that led the employee to be-
lieve that he or she would not be discharged without good cause. 6
Under the violation of public policy theory, the plaintiff alleges that
the termination violated an important social policy.3 7 A Pennsylvania
court has held that a discharge motivated by a specific intent to in-
jure the employee is simply one kind of a termination that violates
public policy.38 While the gravamen of the wrong in any bad faith
case is unreasonable conduct, such unreasonable conduct apparently
need not rise to the level of willfulness.3" In fact, in at least one
state, an employer's liability may be based on merely negligent con-
duct such as terminating an employee without having notified him of
deficiencies in his job performance.4"
Liability for wrongful termination does not always require a
level of intent sufficient to apply an intentional acts exclusion; liabil-
ity can be imposed even though the employer did not specifically in-
32. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 181 Cal. App.3d 532, 226 Cal. Rptr. 435
(1986).
33. See Meyer v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 542
(1965).
34. See Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal.3d 865, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d
1098 (1978); Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, 393 Mass. 81, 469 N.E.2d 797 (1984).
35. See Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976) (employer
fired employees in alphabetical order to force them to reveal information regarding on-the-job
thefts).
36. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., III Cal. App.3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1981).
37. See Molush v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
38. See Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa. Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1981).
39. Cf. Maxon v. Security Co., 214 Cal. App.2d 603, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1963).
40. See Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (judgment
for employee even though employer did not violate public policy or breach its contract, and the
employee was incompetent).
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tend to harm the employee. Because of the potential for coverage, a
duty to defend is not precluded by this exclusion, even though litiga-
tion may eventually reveal a degree of intent that precludes indem-
nity for any awarded damages.
F. Employee Exclusions
General liability policies frequently exclude coverage of "bodily
injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course
of employment by the insured." Because wrongful termination plain-
tiffs are employees prior to their termination, this exclusion arguably
eliminates coverage for damages suffered at or before the time of
termination.
It is not clear whether a terminated employee is still an em-
ployee at the point of his termination and whether injuries arise out
of and are sustained in the course of such employment for purposes
of the exclusion. A plaintiff who continues to work for a period of
time after being told that his employment is to be terminated is an
employee at the time he suffers injury from being informed of his
termination. Even if the plaintiff's employment was terminated at
the same moment that he was told of the termination, the exclusion
may arguably apply because the plaintiff was an employee at that
moment.
The exclusion, however, precludes coverage only if the injury
both arose out of and was sustained in the course of employment.
While injuries resulting from wrongful termination may "arise out
of" employment, as that term is generally used for insurance pur-
poses, it is not clear that they are sustained "in the course of" em-
ployment. While the tandem requirements have been construed in
the context of workers' compensation cases,41 their application to in-
surance coverage has not yet been resolved. Termination is probably
not "in the course of" employment. That term ordinarily refers to
the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurs.
An employee is "in the course of" his employment when he does
those things that the contract of employment requires or permits. A
California court explained that injury from wrongful termination is
not compensable within the workers compensation system "because
it would not be work-related within the Labor Code . . .which re-
quires that an injury arise out of 'employment, occur in the course of
employment, and be proximately caused by the employment rather
41. Maher v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 33 Cal.3d 729, 190 Cal. Rptr.
904, 661 P.2d 1058 (1983).
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than termination of employment. '4 2 Under such reasoning, injury
from wrongful discharge is not excluded by the employee exclusion.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and universally accepted principle
of insurance law that all ambiguities are construed against the in-
surer and that all exclusions are interpreted narrowly. Given the am-
biguity of an employee exclusion when applied to a wrongful termi-
nation case, the provision should not support a denial of defense and
probably does not exclude coverage of damages for resulting injuries.
Another frequent provision excludes "obligations for which the
insured or any carrier as his insurer may be held liable under any
workers' compensation, unemployment compensation or disability
benefits law or under any similar law." Such an exclusion does not
apply to wrongful termination claims that are not compensable
within the workers' compensation system." s Claims that are within
the workers' compensation system, however, such as wrongful termi-
nation in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim,"" are
excluded.
Employee exclusions are usually ambiguous when applied to
wrongful termination claims. A terminated worker may not be an
"employee" at the time he or she suffers emotional injury from the
termination, and such injury probably is not sustained in the
"course" of his or her employment. For these reasons, a denial of the
duty to defend the insured should not be based solely on an employee
exclusion.
G. Employee Benefits Coverage
A few insurers offer, by endorsement to a general liability policy
or as a separate policy, coverage for liability arising out of an em-
ployer's administration of employee benefits. Because wrongful ter-
mination plaintiffs frequently allege that the purpose of their termi-
nation was to deprive them of employee benefits,45 there is potential
coverage under an employee benefits policy.
Such a policy, or policy part, generally provides coverage for
42. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. W.C.A.B., 144 Cal. App.3d 74, 75, 192 Cal. Rptr. 643, 645
(emphasis in original).
43. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. W.C.A.B., 144 Cal. App.3d 72, 75, 192 Cal. Rptr. 643,
645 (1983) (stating in dicta that injury caused by employment termination is not compensable
within workers' compensation system because it is not work-related within meaning of labor
code).
44. Portillo v. G.T. Price Products, Inc., 131 Cal. App.3d 285, 182 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1982); see also supra note 13.
45. See, e.g., Shipper v. Avon Products, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); John-
son v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 149 Cal. App.3d 518, 196 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1983).
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sums that the insured "becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
on account of any claim made against the insured for any wrongful
act." This very broad coverage grant is limited by the definition of
"wrongful act," which generally includes any negligent act or omis-
sion in the discharge of duties in the "administration of employee
benefits." The term "administration" is, in turn, defined to include
various functions such as counseling employees regarding benefits,
interpreting benefits, commencing or cancelling benefits, and han-
dling employee benefit records. Unlike a general liability policy, an
employee benefits policy is intended to cover financial obligations
only. It typically excludes coverage of any claim arising out of bodily
injury or tangible property damage. For this reason, coverage of
damages awarded in a wrongful termination case is limited; the com-
pany will indemnify only for the economic injury resulting from
wrongful administration of employee benefits. Damages for emo-
tional distress are not covered. Nonetheless, a duty to defend the
entire action arises under any allegation of the employer's negligence
in the administration of its employee benefits plan.
H. Personal Injury Coverage
Many comprehensive general liability policies include a "per-
sonal injury" liability coverage part that provides coverage for
"[i]njury . . . arising out of one or more of the following offenses:
A publication or utterance of a libel or slander or other defama-
tory or disparaging material, or in violation of an individual's right
of privacy . . . ." Such a coverage part may be applicable to a claim
of wrongful termination if the employee plaintiff alleges defamation
or invasion of privacy. Since employment termination is frequently
accompanied by statements regarding the employee's competence or
integrity, a discharged employee may allege defamation. 46 A former
employee who is given a poor reference by his previous employer
may claim he was defamed. 7 In fact, the discharge itself may be
considered defamatory in some circumstances. The South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the discharge of an employee after the em-
ployer's administration of a polygraph test could support a claim for
defamation,48 and a Pennsylvania court has intimated that the act of
46. Holloway v. K-Mart Corp., 113 Wis.2d 143, 334 N.W.2d 570 (1983) (verdict of
defamation upheld when employer said employee had been fired for stealing).
47. Anderberg v. Georgia Elec. Membership Corp., 175 Ga. App. 14, 332 S.E.2d 326
(1985).
48. Tyler v. Macks Stores, 275 S.C. 456, 272 S.E.2d 633 (1980).
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terminating employment might, itself, support a suit for slander.49
Since a personal injury coverage provision generally does not
limit the coverage to damages arising from "bodily injury," the pol-
icy covers the purely emotional or mental injuries often alleged by
discharged employees if the employer has in some manner defamed
its former employee or violated his or her privacy. Such a policy
provision may cover claims that the employer impugned the plain-
tiff's character or damaged his or her reputation.50 Since plaintiffs
frequently allege that they were given a poor reference or were not
recommended for subsequent employment, the potential for coverage
under a personal injury endorsement exists.
In addition, and in contrast to a standard general liability cover-
age part, a personal injury liability coverage provision only requires
that the offense occur during the policy period; the resulting injury
need not. As a result, an injury sustained outside the policy period
may be covered nonetheless if the offense occurred within the policy
period. Also, since a personal injury coverage part often does not
exclude employee injuries, coverage of injury from defamation and
invasion of privacy does not depend on whether it was sustained by
an employee in the course of employment. 1
Another typical provision of a personal injury coverage part ex-
cludes injury from defamation "made by or at the direction of the
insured with knowledge of the falsity thereof." If the employee al-
leges that defamatory remarks were made with knowledge of their
falsity, this provision may be applicable. Such knowledge, however,
is not a prerequisite to liability. Since potential liability can be based
on unexcluded conduct, that is, defamation without knowledge of its
falsity, a duty to defend arises.
A policy containing personal injury coverage of defamation and
invasion of privacy potentially covers injuries arising out of termina-
tion if the plaintiff alleges slander, damage to reputation, or invasion
of privacy.52 Because many wrongful termination plaintiffs allege
49. Berg v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 280 Pa. Super. 495, 501 n.1, 421 A.2d 831,
834 n.1 (1980) ("Whether mere conduct alone, in absence of any verbal communication,
would support a suit in slander" was not decided, however, the court noted that "it would be
difficult to argue against it."); but see Hoover v. Livingston Bank, 451 So.2d 3 (La. 1984)
(bank's investigation of money shortage and subsequent suspension of employee did not consti-
tute defamation).
50. Interco, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 626 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (employment
termination did not itself constitute defamation for insurance coverage purposes despite the
fact that plaintiff alleged damage to his reputation).
51. While the standard form policy does include an employee exclusion, it is frequently
"bought back" or deleted in exchange for an increased premium.
52. See Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (employee
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such damage, the potential for coverage arises under a personal in-
jury endorsement.
III. Professional Liability Policies
A professional liability or, as it is frequently called, an "errors
and omissions," policy provides coverage for professional negligence
or malpractice in the conduct of the insured's designated profession.
The coverage agreement in a typical professional liability policy,
sometimes specified as "Coverage A," provides coverage for "dam-
ages because of injury arising out of the rendering or the failure to
render professional services in the practice of the named insured's
profession." Such a policy is not a general liability policy; it is in-
tended to cover claims of negligence arising only out of the insured's
professional practice.
Since the policy frequently does not define the term "profes-
sional services" precisely, courts in most states construe the term
broadly. 53 Despite the broad construction of "professional services,"
however, damages resulting from wrongful termination of employ-
ment are probably not covered by such a policy. For example, in
Schiff Associates, Inc. v. Flack,5" a New York appellate court ruled
that a claim such as misappropriation of a trade secret is not the
result of the rendering of professional services within the meaning of
a professional liability policy and further implied that employee dis-
putes were not within the policy's coverage. The court stated as
follows:
The renting of an office, the engagement of employees, ar-
rangements to expand the size of one's activities, these may all
have some connection with a covered business or profession. But,
while they may set the stage for performance of business or pro-
fessional services, they are not the professional activities contem-
plated by the special coverage. An errors and omissions policy is
intended to insure a member of a designated calling against lia-
bility arising out of the mistakes inherent in the practice of that
particular profession or business . . . . After all, the plaintiff's
policy here was neither a standard general liability policy nor a
standard general liability policy with a contractual liability en-
allegedly discharged for refusing to take a polygraph test).
53. See Geddes v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 264 Cal. App.2d 181, 70 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1968)
(psychiatrist was engaged in professional services when he made allegedly slanderous state-
ments regarding a hospital to another psychiatrist).
54. 51 N.Y.2d 692, 417 N.E.2d 84, 435 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1980).
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dorsement. Nor was it one comprehensive enough to protect
against all business vicissitudes."
While few courts have considered the issue, the foregoing reasoning
is persuasive. Thus, a professional liability policy should not provide
coverage for an employee's claim of wrongful termination.
Some professional liability policies include an office premises li-
ability provision, sometimes labeled "Coverage B." Such a provision
obligates the insurer to pay damages because of personal injury or
property damage caused by an occurrence arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance, or use of the insured premises, provided that such
operations are incidental to the practice of the insured's profession.
Coverage under this provision depends on a variety of factors, such
as whether the plaintiff suffers "personal injury" or "property dam-
age"; whether the incident constitutes an "occurrence"; whether
such an occurrence arises out of the "ownership, maintenance, or
use" of the insured premises; and whether the employee exclusion
applies.
"Personal injury" is usually defined under the office premises
liability coverage part as: "[b]odily injury, sickness, disease, disabil-
ity or shock, . . . or, if arising out of the foregoing, mental anguish
and mental injury; . . . libel, defamation of character, humiliation,
or invasion of the right of privacy." Typical allegations in a wrongful
discharge complaint fall within this definition, since plaintiffs fre-
quently allege anxiety, worry, physical and emotional distress, hu-
miliation, and embarrassment. In addition, an allegation that the
employer impugned the plaintiff's character or made disparaging re-
marks, either before or after his termination, would present a co-
vered claim.
There are several impediments to coverage under a professional
liability policy. The law of many states does not permit the applica-
tion of insurance proceeds to liability for compensatory or punitive
damages based on intentional torts.5" This principle does not pre-
clude the insurer's provision of a defense because liability could be
based on a less culpable state of mind not inconsistent with insur-
ance coverage; 57 however, damages awarded for injury intentionally
caused are not covered. Also, most professional liability policy forms
55. Id. at 700, 417 N.E.2d at 88, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 976 (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., City Prods. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App.3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr.
494 (1979); Guarantee Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 228 Kan. 532,
534, 618 P.2d 1195, 1197 (1980).
57. See. e.g., Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal.3d 865, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 587
P.2d 1098 (1978).
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contain an exclusion eliminating coverage for personal injury sus-
tained by an employee in the course of his or her employment. As
discussed above, this does not entirely eliminate coverage because
some damages may have been sustained after the termination of the
plaintiff's employment.
Another coverage issue is whether wrongful termination dam-
ages "arise out of the ownership, maintenance, and use" of the in-
sured's premises. Generally, that provision is satisfied only when
there is some causal connection between the premises themselves and
the injuries sustained.5" In addition, many damages do not come
within the definition of "property damage" or "personal injury." For
instance, claims for lost benefits and wages are not subject to cover-
age. 59 Finally, such a policy requires that the injuries result from an
"accidental" occurrence. This requirement appears to eliminate co-
verage for many wrongful discharge complaints that are premised
solely on intentional conduct resulting in expected injury.
In summary, there is seldom coverage for damages resulting
from wrongful termination under a professional liability policy.
Under Coverage A, such damages do not arise out of the rendering
of professional services. Under Coverage B, the damages do not arise
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the insured's premises,
may not fall within the definition of personal injury or property dam-
age, and, most importantly, are not "accidental."
IV. Directors and Officers Liability Policies
Most states, by statute, authorize corporations to purchase in-
surance on behalf of its corporate officials to insure them against
liability incurred in their official capacity. 60 Such directors' and of-
ficers' ["D&O"] policies vary considerably, and there apparently is
no standard form policy.6 A typical D&O policy insures against
"loss" arising from the "wrongful acts" of corporate officials. Such
58. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co.,
577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978).
59. Southeastern Color Lithographers, Inc. v. Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co., 164 Ga. App.
70, 296 S.E.2d 378 (1982) (lost wages are not property damage within liability insurance
policy).
60. See. e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1983); see also REVISED MODEL BUSI-
NESS CORP. ACT § 8.57 (1984).
61. One of the most common is the Lloyd's of London two-part form, Form ALS (D4)
and (D5). The complete text of the Directors and Officers form, ALS (D5), is contained in
Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33
Bus. LAW. 1993 app. at 2047-53 (1978). Another common policy is the Lloyd's Lydando form.
A complete copy of this form is contained in W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS app. D at 735-50 (3d ed. 1978).
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policies insure only the individual directors and officers. They do not
insure the corporation or other commercial entity against damages
arising from claims against it." In addition, they cover corporate
officials only when they are acting in their official capacity as direc-
tor or officer. Thus, the rare complaint that includes only allegations
of misconduct not within the scope of the insured's official duties
may not present a covered claim.
The policy generally covers "losses" arising from "wrongful
acts." A covered loss is, by definition, an amount that the insured is
legally obligated to pay which is not indemnified by his or her com-
pany.6" Because of this language, D&O policies generally provide
only indemnity against loss and not against liability. This significant
distinction eliminates the insurer's duty to defend any action that
alleges a potentially covered claim. The insurer is not required to
pay legal expenses until covered liability has been established.6
Most D&O policies cover only losses resulting from "wrongful
acts," which usually is defined to include any breach of duty, mis-
statement, misleading statement, or act or omission committed by
the director or officer in an official capacity. Many of the typical
allegations accompanying wrongful termination claims fall into this
fairly broad definition. While conduct motivated by personal gain
and dishonest conduct are expressly excluded from coverage, injuries
resulting from intentional acts are not. As a result, a D&O policy
may cover a wrongful termination claim.65 The injury-causing occur-
rence need not be an accident which was unintended and unexpected
by the insured.
Many D&O policies exclude coverage of liability for libel and
slander, personal injury, emotional distress, bodily injury and prop-
erty damage. In contrast to a general liability policy, an award for
such special damages is not covered while an award for lost wages
62. They usually do, however, insure the corporation itself against the corporation's
proper indemnification of its directors and officers.
63. Amounts paid as an award in, or in settlement of, a civil injury action are "losses"
within the meaning of such a policy. D&O policies do, however, usually define "loss" to ex-
clude fines or penalties.
64. But see Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 795 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1986); Pepsico, Inc.
v. Continental Casualty Co., 640 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (insurer under D&O policy
had duty to pay defense costs of directors as they were incurred).
65. Allegations of a director's or officer's participation in a wrongful termination of em-
ployment may create a duty to defend or pay defense costs. See Okada v. MGIC Indem.
Corp., 795 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1986). There is, however, authority indicating that an agent of
a corporation cannot be held liable for breaching, or inducing the breach of, the corporation's
employment contract, unless he or she acted in an individual capacity for individual gain. See
Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App.2d 50, 72, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 665 (1963). The duty
to indemnify is imposed in those cases in which the officer or director is held personally liable.
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and benefits may be covered.
V. Employer Liability/Workers' Compensation Policy
A typical workers' compensation and employer's liability policy
consists of two parts. "Coverage A" obligates the company to pay
for all compensation and other benefits required by the insured
through the workers' compensation system. "Coverage B" provides
coverage of employee injuries arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment. There is usually no coverage for wrongful termination
claims under either part.
A. Coverage A-Worker's Compensation Coverage
The first coverage provision obligates the insurer to pay "all
compensation and other benefits required of the insured by the work-
ers' compensation law." In most states, the extent to which injury
from wrongful discharge is covered by workers' compensation is un-
clear. Under workers' compensation law, the exclusive remedy for
torts based on negligent conduct when the alleged injury arises out
of employment and is sustained in the course of employment is the
worker's compensation system." Mental suffering alone, however,
may not be a compensable injury under a workers' compensation
system.6"
The workers' compensation system in some states does apply to
suits alleging emotional distress accompanied by physical injury and
disability resulting from employment termination. In Gates v. Trans
Video Corp.," an employee sought compensation for the emotional
distress he suffered as a result of his discharge. The employee did
not sue for wrongful termination; instead, he alleged intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. The court held that since the employee
alleged that he was physically disabled as a result of his employer's
actions, he suffered a compensable injury under the California
Workers' Compensation Act. As a result, his civil action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress was barred. However, the court
in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. W.C.A.B.69 explained that injury caused
by employment termination is not compensable within the workers'
compensation system because it does not arise out of or occur in the
66. Williams v. Schwartz, 61 Cal. App.3d 628, 131 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1976); see also
supra notes 73, 44 and accompanying text.
67. Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App.3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
68. 93 Cal. App.3d 196, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979).
69. 144 Cal. App.3d 73, 75, 192 Cal. Rptr. 643, 645 (1983).
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course of employment. Under such reasoning, only pretermination
injuries may fall within the workers' compensation and, therefore,
within Coverage A; injuries resulting from the termination itself are
not within the workers' compensation system.
If an action falls within the workers' compensation system, Cov-
erage A of the employer's liability policy will provide coverage for
the damages awarded in that action. Workers' compensation acts
sometimes provide no remedy, however, for claims of emotional dis-
tress unaccompanied by physical injury, and courts have held that a
plaintiff must assert such claims through a civil action."'
B. Coverage B - Employer's Liability Coverage
"Coverage B" of a standard employer's liability policy may pro-
vide that the company will "[p]ay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injury by accident or disease, . . . sustained by
any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his
employment by the insured." Unless a policy specifically excludes
injuries arising from the insured's wrongful discharge or termination
of employment, which is increasingly common, the policy may pro-
vide coverage of a wrongful termination claim. Coverage of wrongful
termination under this provision largely depends on the same three
unsettled issues of law involved in a general liability policy: first,
whether wrongful termination is an accident; second, whether it re-
sults in bodily injury; and third, whether the injuries arise out of and
in the course of employment.7 '
Employer's liability insurance, "Coverage B," is traditionally
written in conjunction with workers' compensation policies, "Cover-
age A," and is "intended to serve as a 'gap-filler,' providing protec-
tion to the employer in those situations where the employee has a
right to bring a tort action despite the provisions of the workers'
compensation statute or the employee is not subject to the workers'
compensation law."7 2 As the California Supreme Court recently
explained,
The key feature to an employer's liability policy, .... is the
employment relationship required between the insured and the
70. Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App.3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
71. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. W.C.A.B., 144 Cal. App.3d 73, 192 Cal. Rptr. 643
(1983).
72. Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal.3d 903, 916, 226 Cal. Rptr.
558, 565, 718 P.2d 920, 927 (1986).
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injured employee before the policy affords coverage . . . . The
policy is not a general liability policy providing coverage for in-
juries to members of the general public; instead it provides cov-
erage to employers for those injuries to their employees not cov-
ered by workers' compensation.7
Under such reasoning, the purpose of an employer's liability policy is
to cover injuries sustained by employees, or arising out of the em-
ployment relationship, which, for some reason, do not fall within the
workers' compensation system. Injuries resulting from termination of
employment probably come within this broad ambit.
As previously indicated, the "Coverage B" provision requires
that the injury be the result of an "accident." The various causes of
action arising from wrongful termination are generally not "acci-
dents" within an insurance coverage agreement."' Further, the em-
ployee's allegations and claims must be studied to determine whether
they constitute "bodily injury" as defined by the policy. As indicated
above, allegations of emotional distress probably do fall within the
definition. Finally, "Coverage B" provides coverage if the injury both
arises out of and is sustained in the course of employment. As dis-
cussed earlier, while injuries resulting from wrongful termination
may arise out of employment, they may not be sustained in the
course of employment.
At lease one state has determined that wrongful discharge
claims do not fall within a workers' compensation/employer's liabil-
ity insurance policy. In Artco-Bell Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Co.,715 the Court of Appeals of Texas held that such injuries
were not covered under a workers' compensation policy because they
did not constitute "physical injuries" and because they were ex-
cluded as "willfully inflicted" by the employer. The court stated as
follows:
[W]e think it is clear that "compensation and other bene-
fits" as contemplated by the act and the insurance policy in-
volved here, mean compensation and medical care, or death ben-
efits, resulting from accidental injuries to the body, and not
damage which may be recovered in a separate suit for wrongful
discharge . . . . Even if the general policy language here could
be construed to encompass damages for wrongful discharge,
Artco-Bell would still be faced with other provisions of the pol-
73. Id. at 917, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 566, 718 P.2d at 928. "
74. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App.3d 1199, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 5 (1984).
75. 649 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1983).
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icy which restrict its application to physical injuries, and exclude
coverage for injuries wilfully inflicted or caused by the
employer.
70
The court continued, explaining that:
Undoubtedly, employers can purchase insurance covering
their liability in wrongful discharge cases, but we do not believe
that a contract to pay all compensation and other benefits re-
quired under the worker's compensation law should be held to
encompass the other liability unless the text or context of the
policy plainly requires it."
The court did not, however, disclose what type of insurance would
cover such liability. The policy involved in the Artco-Bell case ap-
parently provided only "Coverage A" and not "Coverage B."
The Texas Court of Appeals recently reiterated the Artco-Bell
holding in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gaedcke Equipment Co. 8 The
court there held that a workers' compensation insurer does not have
a duty to defend an insured employer in a wrongful discharge suit.
The policy involved in that case clearly did have a "Coverage B"
provision, which provided coverage of "all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily
injury by accident or disease." Nonetheless, the court followed the
holding in Artco-Bell and held that the insurer had no duty to de-
fend the employer.
In summary, although wrongful discharge is employment-re-
lated, coverage under an employer's liability policy presents many of
the same problems as coverage under a general liability policy.
"Coverage A," the workers' compensation liability part, will rarely
cover purely emotional injuries arising from unemployment termina-
tion since such injuries may not come within the workers' compensa-
tion system. "Coverage B" will provide coverage only if the injuries
are considered "accidental" and arise out of and in the course of the
claimant's employment. Since several courts have held that wrongful
termination, and the resulting injuries, are not "accidental," cover-
age under an employers' liability policy is unlikely.
VI. Umbrella Policy
A typical "umbrella" policy provides additional coverage after
76. Id. at 724.
77. Id.
78. 716 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Tex. 1986).
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the exhaustion of the limits of the underlying "primary" policy.
Most umbrella policies operate as a primary policy if, for some rea-
son, the claim is not covered under the primary policy.
Because the insuring agreements of umbrella policies are similar
to those in primary general liability policies, the same problems
arise. Umbrella policies contain provisions requiring "bodily injury"
or "personal injury" similar to those contained in the primary poli-
cies previously discussed. More importantly, standard umbrella poli-
cies also cover only injury resulting from an "occurrence," which is,
by definition, "an accident . . . which results in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured." The courts considering the question have concluded
that wrongful termination is not an accident resulting in unexpected,
unintended injury. For this reason, coverage under such a policy is
unlikely.7 Some umbrella policies do, however, expressly provide for
coverage of discrimination and humiliation, which may be involved
in a wrongful discharge action. Also, many umbrella policies do not
contain an employee exclusion. For these reasons, a greater potential
for coverage exists under an umbrella policy than under a general
liability policy.
VII. Homeowner's Policies
Many wrongful termination defendants are employers operating
in corporate form or as a commercial entity of some sort. Such de-
fendants are usually insured under one of the business policies dis-
cussed above. Occasionally, however, an individual insured under a
homeowner's policy is sued for wrongful termination.
Many of the issues discussed above are also involved in a home-
owner's policy liability coverage part. For instance, most home-
owner's policies cover only bodily injury or property damage result-
ing from an accidental occurrence. In addition, however, the
following provisions in a standard homeowner's policy may preclude
coverage of wrongful termination claims:
This policy does not apply to bodily injury or property
damage:
Which is expected or intended by the insured;
79. But see Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980) (umbrella policy provided coverage for the defense of an em-
ployee's sex discrimination action because the complaint was pleaded in such general terms
that it could include unintentional discrimination).
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Arising out of business pursuits of any insured. This exclu-
sion does not apply to: activities which are ordinarily incident to
nonbusiness pursuits.
The first quoted exclusion has been discussed above; several
courts have held or implied that injury from wrongful termination is
typically expected. The second exclusion, known as a "business pur-
suits" exclusion, may also apply. Business is typically defined as any
"trade, profession or occupation." Since a wrongful discharge claim
arises out of the insured's employment relationship, and that rela-
tionship is necessarily incidental to the insured's trade, profession, or
occupation, the claim probably arises from the insured's business
pursuit. If, however, the claim falls within the exclusion's exception
for conduct "ordinarily incident to nonbusiness pursuits," the poten-
tial for coverage exists. If the former employee alleges conduct that
is generally associated with pursuits other than those associated with
a business, a court may consider the exclusion sufficiently ambiguous
to preclude a denial of defense by the insurer.
VIII. Conclusion
Many problems arise in determining the existence of insurance
coverage for a wrongful termination claim under available standard
policies. A termination claim may not constitute a claim for property
damage or bodily injury caused by an occurrence within the meaning
of most primary or umbrella general liability policies. Further, the
loss may be excluded by provisions such as an employee or inten-
tional acts exclusion. A professional liability policy may not provide
coverage because discharge of an employee is not accidental and
may not arise out of the insured's profession. A directors' and of-
ficers' liability policy insures individual corporate officials only, not
the corporate entity that employs the individual. Also, damages from
wrongful termination may not be a "loss" arising from a "wrongful
act" under D&O policy definitions. Such claims are generally not
within an employer liability policy because they are not within the
workers' compensation system or are not accidents arising out of and
in the course of employment. Finally, the standard business pursuits
exclusion, as well as the definition of the terms used in the coverage
provision, may preclude coverage under a homeowner's policy.
The many types of policies currently available to corporate and
individual employers were largely written before the development of
new tort theories for wrongful termination. As a result, analysis of
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coverage under them is inexact and accompanied by more than the
usual degree of speculation. Some insurance companies are respond-
ing to the coverage problems by expressly excluding or covering
wrongful termination claims. At least one insurance group has re-
cently offered a policy that provides coverage for legal expenses in-
curred in defending actions alleging wrongful termination, employ-
ment discrimination, or sexual harassment.80 Nonetheless, the
majority of policies insuring employers do not expressly refer to cov-
erage for such claims. As a result, coverage of wrongful termination
claims is determined under policies that were drafted without consid-
eration or anticipation of the currently available theories of recovery
and the numerous problems that have arisen.
80. Offered by NAS Insurance Services, Inc. (Aronson Group). See National Under-
writer, Property & Casualty Ins. Edition, Sept. 20, 1985, No. 38, p. 26.
